Cybersecurity

UAT-10147 Uses AI to Scale Server Attacks and Deploy Advanced Cross-Platform Malware

By Parviz Nasirov
UAT-10147 Uses AI to Scale Windows and Linux Server Attacks

Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a Chinese-speaking threat actor tracked as UAT-10147 that is using AI-assisted tools to scale attacks against vulnerable Windows and Linux web servers. The group combines known exploits with automated reconnaissance, exploit validation, payload deployment, and post-exploitation workflows, while deploying malware including SPECTRE, BadIIS, Quasar RAT, Noodle RAT, and a Linux kernel rootkit.

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group known as UAT-10147 that is targeting vulnerable Windows and Linux web servers across multiple countries and industries.

The campaign affects organisations in sectors including:

  • Education
  • Media
  • Technology
  • Gaming
  • Government-related environments

Cisco Talos researchers say the group uses publicly disclosed vulnerabilities to compromise exposed servers at scale and then combines traditional offensive tooling with AI-assisted workflows to accelerate exploitation and post-compromise operations.

Approximately 170,000 URLs Found in Target List

One of the most significant discoveries came from an exposed directory associated with the threat actor's infrastructure.

Researchers found a target list containing approximately 170,000 URLs.

The attackers had divided this list into 17 smaller files containing around 10,000 URLs each, apparently allowing the infrastructure to process large groups of potential targets more efficiently.

This does not necessarily mean that 170,000 servers were successfully compromised.

Instead, the number provides insight into the operational scale of the campaign and how attackers are attempting to industrialize vulnerability exploitation.

The most heavily represented countries in the target list included:

  • United States
  • India
  • United Kingdom
  • Germany
  • Netherlands

Confirmed victim activity, however, was particularly concentrated in countries including Brazil, Bolivia, China, Canada, and Vietnam.

AI Is Used Across the Attack Lifecycle

The most notable aspect of the campaign is UAT-10147's use of artificial intelligence.

According to researchers, AI-assisted tooling is being incorporated into multiple stages of the attack process, including:

  • Reconnaissance
  • Exploit development and refinement
  • Exploit validation
  • Troubleshooting failed attacks
  • Payload generation
  • Post-exploitation workflows
  • Persistence
  • Operational documentation

Rather than relying solely on AI to invent completely new vulnerabilities, the group appears to use AI as an operational multiplier.

This allows the attackers to improve existing exploit code, troubleshoot technical problems, and automate repetitive stages of intrusion campaigns.

PentestGPT and DeepAudit

Researchers discovered that the threat actor had installed PentestGPT, an open-source autonomous penetration-testing framework, on command-and-control infrastructure.

The tool was used to scan web servers and execute relevant proof-of-concept exploits against potential targets.

In at least one observed case, the attackers successfully compromised a web server and used Linux commands to collect information about the victim system.

The infrastructure also contained another AI-oriented security tool called DeepAudit.

DeepAudit appears to have been used for vulnerability scanning.

Cisco Talos said it did not find evidence confirming that vulnerabilities discovered by DeepAudit were directly exploited in victim environments.

However, the tool may have been intended to help identify weaknesses in future targets — or potentially to audit the attackers' own infrastructure.

Known Vulnerabilities Used for Initial Access

UAT-10147 primarily relies on already-known vulnerabilities rather than zero-day exploits.

Among the vulnerabilities associated with the campaign are:

  • CVE-2022-27925 — Zimbra
  • CVE-2021-23758 — AjaxPro
  • CVE-2019-18935 — Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX
  • CVE-2021-29441 — Alibaba Nacos
  • CVE-2021-29442 — Alibaba Nacos

Successful exploitation can provide remote code execution on vulnerable web servers.

Once initial access is achieved, automated scripts are used to escalate privileges, install malware, establish persistence, and prepare the compromised host for additional malicious activity.

Windows Attack Chain

On Windows servers, UAT-10147 has been observed using batch scripts to automate several stages of compromise.

Attackers use legitimate Windows utilities such as certutil to download additional payloads.

These may include:

  • EfsPotato
  • Quasar RAT
  • Additional batch scripts
  • BadIIS
  • SPECTRE

EfsPotato can be used for privilege escalation.

After gaining elevated privileges, the attackers can modify Microsoft Defender exclusions, deploy additional malware, and remove initial payloads to complicate forensic investigation.

The group also creates deceptive scheduled tasks, including one named:

Google Chrome Start

This allows Quasar RAT to persist on compromised Windows systems.

SPECTRE Cross-Platform Backdoor

One of the most advanced components associated with UAT-10147 is a previously undocumented malware family called SPECTRE.

SPECTRE is written in C and supports both Windows and Linux.

The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTPS and includes extensive anti-analysis and remote-control functionality.

Researchers identified up to 45 commands in the Windows version.

Capabilities include:

  • File operations
  • Keylogging
  • Screenshot capture
  • Uploading and downloading files
  • Shell command execution
  • Process enumeration
  • Process termination
  • System reconnaissance
  • Shellcode injection
  • Process hollowing
  • Early Bird APC injection
  • Credential theft
  • Timestamp modification
  • Self-deletion
  • EDR bypass

The first observed use of SPECTRE dates back to approximately April 2026.

SPECTRE Can Blind EDR Products

One of SPECTRE's most dangerous Windows capabilities is its use of Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) techniques.

Instead of exploiting the operating system directly, the malware loads legitimate but vulnerable kernel drivers and abuses their privileged access.

The campaign uses vulnerable drivers including:

  • MSI RTCore64.sys — CVE-2019-16098
  • Dell DBUtil_2_3.sys — CVE-2021-21551

SPECTRE can use these drivers to modify kernel structures associated with endpoint security products.

Researchers say this can effectively remove security callbacks used by EDR platforms to detect:

  • New processes
  • New threads
  • Image loading events

This can significantly reduce visibility for endpoint security products after the system is compromised.

Linux Systems Get a Kernel Rootkit

The Linux version of SPECTRE also provides extensive remote-control capabilities.

It performs anti-sandbox checks before connecting to the attacker's C2 infrastructure.

The malware evaluates characteristics such as:

  • RAM size
  • Number of CPU cores
  • Disk capacity
  • Process names
  • Sandbox-related usernames
  • Hostnames
  • Sleep acceleration behaviour

If enough suspicious indicators are detected, SPECTRE terminates itself.

The Linux version supports approximately 29 commands covering:

  • File manipulation
  • Process reconnaissance
  • System reconnaissance
  • Shell command execution
  • Agent management

Its most powerful component is an integrated kernel-level rootkit called Specter.

Spectre Rootkit Provides Kernel-Level Persistence

The Spectre rootkit is deployed as a Linux kernel module.

Once loaded, it can help the attackers hide malicious activity from user-space security tools and maintain privileged access.

Cisco Talos assesses that portions of the rootkit may have been developed using a combination of AI assistance and human expertise.

Researchers noted characteristics such as:

  • Extensive explanatory comments
  • Highly structured source code
  • Multiple alternative implementations for similar functions
  • Consistent formatting

These patterns may indicate AI-assisted code development, although they do not prove that the malware was entirely generated by AI.

Other Malware Used by UAT-10147

SPECTRE is only one component of the group's broader toolkit.

Researchers also observed:

BadIIS
Malware frequently associated with SEO manipulation and malicious traffic redirection.

Quasar RAT
An open-source remote access Trojan commonly used for remote system control.

Noodle RAT
A Linux-focused remote access Trojan associated with several Chinese-speaking threat clusters.

Gh0stCringe
A RAT derived from the Gh0st RAT malware family.

Meterpreter
The post-exploitation payload commonly associated with the Metasploit Framework.

The variety of tools indicates that UAT-10147 is not dependent on a single malware family.

Instead, it combines custom implants, open-source tooling, commodity malware, and AI-assisted workflows.

Analysis and context

The UAT-10147 campaign demonstrates an important change in cybercrime operations.

The most significant development is not that AI has suddenly created a completely autonomous hacker.

Instead, AI is reducing the cost and expertise required to operate cyberattacks at scale.

Traditionally, large-scale exploitation campaigns required attackers to manually:

  • Research vulnerabilities
  • Modify exploits
  • Diagnose failed payloads
  • Write post-exploitation scripts
  • Generate documentation
  • Validate results
  • Maintain multiple tools

AI can accelerate many of these tasks.

That means relatively ordinary threat actors can potentially operate infrastructure that previously required much larger or more technically sophisticated teams.

AI Turns Vulnerability Lists Into Operational Queues

The approximately 170,000 URLs discovered in UAT-10147's infrastructure illustrate this change particularly well.

The important issue is not whether all 170,000 systems were vulnerable.

Instead, attackers can increasingly treat large target lists like automated workloads.

A modern AI-assisted workflow may look like:

Target discovery
→ vulnerability identification
→ exploit selection
→ exploit modification
→ automated validation
→ troubleshooting
→ persistence
→ reporting results

This begins to resemble a software production pipeline more than a traditional manual hacking operation.

Old Vulnerabilities Become More Dangerous

The campaign also reinforces why organizations should not focus only on newly disclosed zero-days.

UAT-10147 successfully relies heavily on vulnerabilities that have already been public for years.

AI-assisted exploit development can make these older vulnerabilities more dangerous because attackers can rapidly adapt public proof-of-concept code to different environments.

From a defensive perspective, patch latency therefore becomes increasingly important.

If AI reduces the time and expertise required to weaponise known vulnerabilities, organisations may have less time to patch exposed infrastructure before widespread automated exploitation begins.

Internet-Facing Servers Remain High-Risk Assets

The attack chain repeatedly begins with vulnerable public-facing infrastructure.

This includes:

  • IIS servers
  • Linux web servers
  • Zimbra deployments
  • ASP.NET applications
  • Nacos services
  • Other exposed web applications

Internet-facing systems should therefore be treated as high-risk assets.

Organisations should maintain accurate inventories of externally accessible services and prioritise vulnerabilities affecting those systems.

EDR Alone Is Not Enough

SPECTRE's BYOVD capability also demonstrates the limitations of relying entirely on endpoint detection and response software.

If an attacker obtains SYSTEM or root-level access and can manipulate kernel-level security controls, endpoint visibility may be significantly weakened.

Defensive architecture should therefore combine multiple layers:

Patch Management
Prevent the initial compromise.

Attack Surface Management
Identify exposed and forgotten internet-facing services.

EDR Tamper Protection
Reduce attackers' ability to disable endpoint security.

Vulnerable Driver Blocking
Prevent known vulnerable drivers from loading.

Application Allowlisting
Limit execution of untrusted binaries.

Kernel Module Controls
On Linux, restrict unsigned or unauthorised kernel modules.

Network Monitoring
Detect malicious outbound C2 traffic even if endpoint telemetry is unavailable.

Centralized Logging
Forward logs away from the compromised system.

Linux Rootkits Remain Particularly Dangerous

Kernel-level malware creates a major detection challenge.

Once attackers control the kernel, they may be able to manipulate what user-space tools are allowed to see.

A rootkit can potentially hide:

  • Processes
  • Files
  • Network connections
  • Kernel modules
  • User activity

This is why organisations operating Linux servers should monitor kernel-level events, module loading, privilege escalation, and unexpected modifications to systemd services.

AI Is Becoming a Cybercrime Force Multiplier

UAT-10147 represents an important transition in offensive AI use.

The group does not appear to rely on a single autonomous AI system to carry out an entire cyberattack.

Instead, it integrates AI into many smaller operational tasks.

This approach is arguably more practical — and potentially more dangerous.

An attacker does not need an AI capable of independently compromising a network.

They only need AI that makes every human operator:

  • Faster
  • More consistent
  • More scalable
  • Better at troubleshooting
  • More capable of modifying existing exploits

This lowers the barrier to advanced cybercrime.

The defensive implication is clear:

Organisations should assume that known vulnerabilities can now be researched, adapted, tested, and operationalised faster than before.

Security teams need to respond by reducing patch times, minimising exposed services, improving asset visibility, and deploying layered defences that remain effective even when endpoint security is partially disabled.